This paper contributes to qualifying the Basu-Mitra approach to the problem of intergenerational social choice, by analyzing the impact of the structure of the feasible set of utilities on Banerjee's (2006) impossibility theorem. We prove that if the utilities that each generation can possess lie in N ∪ {0}, then an explicit expression for a Paretian social welfare function that accounts for a strengthened form of Hammond Equity for the Future can be given.
Introduction
In ranking sets of infinite horizon intergenerational streams, economists are interested in postulating equity and efficiency in a variety of forms. Some of the combinations are incompatible with the use of certain devices. And of course, appropriate tools of analysis are sufficiently well-behaved on domains that are of interest to the researcher.
With respect to the resolution of the aggregation problem two approaches can be mentioned. The first one is usually called the Diamond approach after Diamond (1965) , and appeals to the use of welfare relations that are continuous with respect to suitable topologies. As is well known, this author established that Paretian welfare relations, continuous in the sup norm, can not treat all generations equally. A second approach is concerned with the possible existence of social welfare functions (SWF's). No topological consideration is made in this case, that we call the Basu-Mitra approach. This line of inquiry follows Basu and Mitra (2003) , whose main result implies that one can dispense with the continuity axiom in Diamond's impossibility theorem.
Two other type of factors must be mentioned in the resolution of the conflict between infinite generations. One includes the version of the Pareto criterion that is impossed in order to account for efficiency, plus the equity-related postulate that is requested. The other factor is the domain of utilities that each generation can possess (that we assume is equal across generations) and in particular, if it is discrete or not. We call that domain the feasible utilities. The use of discrete sets of feasible utilities is backed by the recognition that human perception is not endlessly fine. It is a natural setting if the utilities have a well-defined smallest unit (as happens when they measure monetary amounts).
The Basu-Mitra impossibility theorem shows the incompatibility of two axioms (Anonymity and Paretianity) when we seek SWF's and the feasible set of utilities is the smallest non-trivial one (namely, {0, 1}). Likewise, Basu and Mitra (2007) shows that it is possible to combine Anonymity and a weaker form of the Pareto postulate called Weak Dominance in a SWF, irrespective of the feasible utilities. Therefore the domain restriction is not an issue when we discuss the compatibility of those two pairs of axioms with the existence of SWF's. But for other sets of axioms, the structure of the domain is crucial. Here we prove that if we consider N * instead, then an explicit expression for a Paretian social welfare function that accounts for a strengthened form of Hammond Equity for the Future can be given.
Notation and Preliminaries
Let X denote a subset of R N , that represents a domain of utility sequences or infinite-horizon utility streams. We adopt the usual notation for such utility streams: x = (x 1 , ..., x n , . ......) ∈ X. By (y) con we mean the constant sequence (y, y, ....), and = (x, (y) con ) holds for (x, y, y, y, ....). We write x y if x i y i for each i = 1, 2, ..., and x y if x i > y i for each i = 1, 2, .... Also, x > y holds for x y and x = y.
A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W : X −→ R. In this paper we are concerned with two axioms of different nature on SWF's.
Axiom 1 (Hammond Equity for the Future
Observe that this statement is slightly stronger than the usual HEF, where only W(y) W(x) is requested. Because we obtain a possibility result, we adopt the strongest version that we can justify. 
Then:
(a) Each W n satisfies HEF 
.).
Proof. The construction of the W n 's functions ensures that they are welldefined and satisfy Pareto. Observe that HEF + holds vacuously for W n when n = 0, 1, 2. Thus in order to complete the proof of (a) the only property that we need to check is that W n satisfies HEF + when n 3.
Let us fix n 3 and select elements in {0, 1, 2, ...., n}, in such way that
Some trivial computations yield
because the largest feasible numerator is ψ(n) − ψ(2) and the least feasible denominator is ψ(1) − ψ(0) across all selections of x 1 > y 1 > y > x from {0, 1, 2, ...., n}. Thus one readily checks that
and the proof of (a) is finished.
Regarding (b), we observe that δ n+1 − δ n = 2 (n+2)(n+3) > 0 whenever n 2. Because δ 0 < δ 1 < δ 2 , the sequence {δ n } n=0,1,2,. .. is strictly increasing and the expression (1) produces (b) trivially.
We are ready to prove our theorem. Proof. Our proof is constructive: we give an explicit expression for an SWF on X that satisfies HEF + and Pareto. We lean on the properties of the auxiliary functions studied in Lemma 1.
To check that W is Paretian, take x > y, x, y ∈ X. If x 1 = y 1 then because
. Otherwise x 1 > y 1 and we entail the following inequalities: In order to check that W satisfies HEF (y ) con ) The first inequality above holds because W x 1 satisfies HEF + by Lemma 1 (a). The second one holds by Lemma 1 (b) since x 1 = 0 and y 1 = 0.
Conclusions
Banerjee (2006) argued that " ... a compromise that generates a possibility of ranking infinite utility streams is open to debate and does not necessarily call for abandoning the appealing equity postulate, Hammond Equity for the Future." Here we provide support for such possibility: if the feasible set of utilities is N * then it is possible to strengthen HEF even if we require the full force of the Pareto postulate under the Basu-Mitra approach. Our argument is constructive and a explicit criterion has been provided. Evidences like the discouraging Zame (2007, Theorem 4') -which implies that no Weak Paretian and Anonymous welfare relation can be "explicitly described"-make this feature especially valuable. Table 1 gathers some of the results that have served us to motivate our discussion, and permits to compare differences in the approaches when we vary the feasible utilities. 
